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FILED·

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----------------------------------x

EARL STEVENS,

Plaintiff,
l 7-cv-8603 (JSR)
-v-

ORDER
VODKA & MILK, LLC; VODKA & MILK 2,
LLC; BUCK 50 PRODUCTIONS; and
ERIKA KANE
Defendants.

-----------------------------------x
--'-"i

JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff and counterclaim-defendant Earl Stevens
originally brought this action against author Erica Kane and
publishers Vodka & Milk, LLC; Vodka & Milk 2, LLC; and Buck 50
Productions, making various claims that stem from defendants'
2017 publication of a book - Captain Save a Hoe - that is also
the title of a song that Stevens released in 1993. All
defendants responded with the same set of counterclaims,
including intentional interference with a contract under New
York law. 1 Stevens moves to dismiss that counterclaim. For the
reasons that follow,

that motion is granted and the first

counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice.

: This motion was filed before Erica Kane (apparently a nom de
plume) was served. She makes the exact same counterclaim based
on the exact same allegations as the corporate defendants. By
agreement of the parties, plaintiff's motion incorporates Kane's
counterclaim, and Kane adopts the corporate defendants'
arguments in opposition.
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The elements of a claim of tortious interference with a
contract under New York law are "(l) the existence of a valid
contract between the plaintiff and a third party;
defendant's knowledge of the contract;

(2) the

(3) the defendant's

intentional procurement of the third-party's breach of the
contract without justification;

(4) actual breach of the

contract; and (5) damages resulting therefrom." Kirch v. Liberty
Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 401 (2d Cir. 2006)
Hornstein v. Podwitz, 173 N.E. 674, 675

2;

see also

(N.Y. 1930).

Counterclaimants allege that Stevens contacted various
online retailers and asked that they stop selling
counterclaimants' book, but knew or should have known that the
book did not infringe on Stevens's copyright. They also allege
that Stevens knew or should have known that his interference
would cause these retailers to stop selling the book and thus
breach their contracts with counterclaimants, that this in fact
occurred, and that counterclaimants suffered injuries therefrom.
See ECF Nos. 31, 32, 39 ~~ 14, 17-20.
Stevens makes several arguments in favor of dismissal, only
one of which the Court need address: that this counterclaim is
preempted by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").

In quoting cases, this order omits internal citations,
footnotes, alterations in the originals, and internal quotation
marks, unless otherwise noted.
2

2
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Section 512 of the DMCA limits liability for copyright
infringement by creating safe harbors for internet service
providers that follow certain detailed procedures. One such safe
harbor is found in Section 512(c), which uinsulates service
providers from liability for infringements of which they are
unaware, contained in material posted to their sites by users,
so as to make it commercially feasible for them to provide
valuable Internet services to the public." Capitol Records, LLC
v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2016). This section also
"augments the rights of copyright owners by establishing a
notice-and-takedown regime." Id. at 83. Through that process,
those who believe an internet service provider is hosting
material that infringes on their copyright can submit a formal
takedown notice, and the provider loses the benefit of the safe
harbor if it continues to host the allegedly infringing
material. see 17

u.s.c.

§

512 (c) (1) (C). It is undisputed that

the notices Stevens sent to online retailers were takedown
notices pursuant to this Section of the DMCA.
The DMCA also provides two remedies for posters who believe
their material has been taken down incorrectly. Section 512(g)
requires providers to take "reasonable steps promptly to notify"
the poster whose content has been removed. Id. § 512(g) (2) (A).
The alleged infringer can then send the provider a "counter
notification," including a statement of good-faith belief that
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the material was removed "as a result of mistake or
misidentification.'' Id. § 512 (g) (3) (C). Providers must then
"promptly" inform the person that sent the initial notification
that they will replace the removed material in 10 business days.
Id.

§

512 (g) (2) (B). After those 10 business days have passed

- but before 14, and absent a lawsuit seeking restraint of the
allegedly infringing activity - the provider must put the
material back online. Id. at§ 512(g) (2).
Congress also created the following private cause of action
as a remedy for abuse of this notice-and-takedown system:
Any
person
who
knowingly
materially
misrepresents
that material or activity
is infringing
. shall be liable for any
damages, including costs and attorneys' fees,
incurred by the alleged infringer . . . who is
injured by such misrepresentation, as the
result of the service provider relying upon
such
misrepresentation
in
removing
or
disabling access to the material or activity
claimed to be infringing . . . .
Id.

§

512 (f).

Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, federal law
"shall be the supreme Law of the Land," U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
2, meaning that when state laws threaten the supremacy of
federal law, they are "preempted" and must give way. Relevant
here is "field preemption," which occurs "where Congress has
legislated so comprehensively that federal law occupies an
entire field of regulation and leaves no room for state law."
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Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 313

(2d Cir. 2005).

"Where Congress occupies an entire field,

even

complementary state regulation is impermissible. Field
preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any
state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal
standards." Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012).
Several other courts have held that the remedial provisions
of the DMCA preempt state intentional interference with contract
claims based on the wrongful use of DMCA takedown notices. See
Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1205
(N.D. Cal. 2004)

("In section 512(f), Congress provides an

express remedy for misuse of the DMCA's safe harbor provisions.
It appears that Congress carefully balanced the competing
interests of copyright holders, ISPs, and the public, by
providing immunity subject to relief for any misuse of the
statute."); Amaretto Ranch Breedables, LLC v. Ozimals, Inc., No.
C 10-05696, 2011 WL 2690437, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2011)
("[A] DMCA Takedown Notification is a creature of a federal
statutory regime, and .

that regime preempts any state law

claim based on an allegedly improper DMCA Takedown
Notification."); Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-03783,
2008 WL 962102, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2008). This Court
agrees.
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DMCA takedown notices, and the system of which they are a
part, are creations entirely of federal law. The DMCA is a
complex and comprehensive statutory regime that meticulously
details the steps that providers must take to avoid liability
and that copyright holders must take to enforce their rights.
Congress also included express remedies for alleged infringers
by providing for a counter-notice system and a cause of action
if fraudulent use of the notice and takedown procedures causes
injury. Contrast Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
250-51 (1984)

(permitting state tort remedies for violations of

federal law in an otherwise preempted field, relying on the
absence of a federal remedy) . With this detailed process and
these two express remedies, Congress intended to "appropriately
balance[]

the interests of content owners, on-line and other

service providers, and information users in a way that will
foster the continued development of electronic commerce and the
growth of the Internet." H.R. REP. 105-551(11) at 21 (1998). The
pervasive nature of the DMCA, including an express remedy for
the very wrong that counterclaimants here allege,

"make[s]

reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement" the remedies outlined in the DMCA. Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
Moreover, copyright law has been overwhelmingly controlled
by Congress since the Copyright Act of 1976. Indeed, though it
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does not apply here, the Copyright Act has contained a provision
expressly preempting almost all state law claims sounding in
copyright since October 27, 1998 (the day before the DMCA was
passed). See 17 U.S.C.

§

30l(a). Federal law's near-total

occupation of the field of copyright law further supports an
inference that the federal interest in creating remedies to
ensure compliance with the DMCA "is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject." Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.3
The Court holds that defendants' counterclaim for
intentional interference with contract is preempted by the DMCA.
Amendment of the counterclaim would therefore be futile.
Accordingly, that counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED
Dated:

~~'*

New York, NY
March
2018

£.l,

U.S.D.J.

3 "There is typically a presumption against preemption in areas
of regulation that are traditionally allocated to states and are
of particular local concern. The presumption against federal
preemption disappears, however, in fields of regulation that
have been substantially occupied by federal authority for an
extended period of time." Wachovia, 414 F.3d at 314.
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